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Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive 
Party turned populist?
Eiríkur Bergmann, Professor of Politics, Bifrost University
Abstract
Though nationalism has always been strong in Iceland, populist political parties 
did not emerge as a viable force until after the financial crisis of  2008. On 
wave of  the crisis a completely renewed leadership took over the country’s old 
agrarian party, the Progressive Party (PP), which was rapidly transformed in 
a more populist direction. Still the PP is perhaps more firmly nationalist than 
populist. However, when analyzing communicational changes of  the new post-
crisis leadership it is unavoidable to categorize the party amongst at least the 
softer version of  European populist parties, perhaps closest to the Norwegian 
Progress Party.
Keywords: Populism; Progressive Party; Framsóknarflokkurinn; Iceland 
Introduction 
Right wing nationalistic populist politics have been on the rise throughout Europe, grad-
ually growing in several rounds since the 1970s and heightening in wake of  the financial 
crisis in the early new century. Though nationalism thoroughly is, and has always in 
modern days been, strong in Iceland, populist political parties similar to those on the 
European continent and throughout Scandinavia did not emerge as a viable force until 
at least after the financial crisis of  2008, which hit Iceland severely hard. Out of  the 
Nordic five Iceland suffered the most profound crisis, when its entire oversized financial 
system came tumbling down. The currency tanked spurring rampant inflation and sud-
den economic devastation (for more, see Bergmann 2014).
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On wave of  the crisis a completely renewed leadership took over the country’s old 
agrarian party, the Progressive Party (PP), which was at least partially rapidly retuned in 
a more populist direction. Only few political parties in Europe have been transformed 
from mainstream to become nationalist right wing populist, including the Swiss Peoples 
Party and Austrian Freedom Party.
In this case study I examine whether the Icelandic Progressive Party under the new 
post-crisis leadership has completed such transformation and whether it, thus, should 
be categorized amongst the flora of  populist parties in Europe. If  so, it was the first 
of  such parties in at least the Nordics to head a government, coming into power after 
a landslide win in the Icelandic general parliamentary election in 2013 and forming a 
coalition with the mainstream previously hegemonic right-of-center conservative Inde-
pendence Party (IP).
The paper is structured into four following sections. I start with an overview of  
scholarly debate on contemporary populism, ultimately attempting to frame how popu-
list politics can be understood, particularly the Nordic version, as Icelandic politics is in-
tegrally linked to heritage of  Nordic politics. Secondly I will contextualize developments 
in Icelandic politics since the nineteenth century and analyze its underlying emphasis 
on independence and sovereignty. In the third section I will map political movements, 
which can be understood to be either nationalist or populist. By analyzing the discourse 
of  Progressive Party members post-crisis I will search for examples of  populist commu-
nication discussed in section one. 1 In the last concluding section I will attempt to answer 
whether the Icelandic Progressive Party should be considered populist.
1. Framing populism
For more than two centuries nationalism has been underlying in European politics, even 
surviving the devastations of  the two world wars of  the early twentieth century. In 
the late 1980s Professor of  Politics Klaus von Beyme (1988) identified three waves of  
extreme right movements since 1945: First the nostalgic wave of  fascism found in Ger-
many and Italy before soon dying out, secondly the anti-tax wave in the 1950s and 1960s, 
mostly found in France and finally a more pan European trend appearing in the 1980s.
Populism is a close relative of  nationalism. Similarly to von Beyme’s categorization 
three main waves of  populism are here identified since the 1970s in order to frame 
how populism can be understood. Each wave occurred in wake of  crisis or major social 
change and each growing stronger than the one before. All are identifiable by their own 
qualities and characteristics. First prominent post world war movements tapping into 
nationalist thought rose in opposition to multiculturalism in wake of  the OPEC crisis in 
the 1970s, second was building in the 1990s after end of  the Cold War and the third in 
wake of  the international financial crisis starting in 2008. Before discussing these move-
ments and waves I start with a short framing of  how to understand populism.
The literature on populism is fast growing and definitions vary. These are often quite 
different groupings, holding varieties of  positions, which can be changeable from coun-
try to country and most often constructed around respective national interest, which 
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can as well be contradictory across borders. Often they are even at odds with each other. 
UKIP in Britain for example refused cooperating with the French National Front in 
the European Parliament, which they accused of  being racist (Newman 2014). Many 
of  the populist movements held neo-liberal economic policies while others were mostly 
concerned with protecting the welfare system from infiltration of  foreign immigrants – 
for the benefit of  the ethnic population. This was for example the case in Scandinavia, 
where, interestingly, populist movements in the 1970s had however started out being 
neo-liberal. There existed modest versions, some were primarily nationalist, they could 
be far right or what is called extreme far right, sometimes even the militant version 
denouncing democracy. There were those of  the more fascist nature, mostly found in 
Eastern Europe but also in Greece and other Western European countries, including for 
example Sweden. Then there were also left wing versions. 
Populist politics are thus a broad church. It is not a well-squared set of  rational poli-
cies. Influential analyst of  European right-wing populist, Cas Mudde, defines populism 
a ‘thin-centered ideology’ separating society into two homogenous and antagonistic 
groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ emphasizing the ‘general will’ of  the 
people (Mudde 2007). Alternatively, populism can been seen rather as a style or tech-
nique of  political mobilization and communication (See Grabow and Hartleb 2013, 17). 
However, whichever viewpoint we take some similarities can still be identified, which 
might help in framing the issue. Here, ten general features are identified, further ana-
lyzed in flowing sections.   
Most obviously right wing nationalist populist in Europe campaign against multicul-
turalism and strive to stem flow of  immigration. Secondly populist movements tend to 
be rather authoritarian, often revolving around a strong charismatic leader. Most often 
they rely on what they claim to be a special relationship between leader and the ordi-
nary public. Particularly, the leader is often seen to understand the burdens of  ordinary 
public, which, vitally, are being overlooked by the established political elite. The populist 
leader on the other hand usually claims to know how to solve their problems.
This brings forward the third sheared characteristics. The message for solving the 
ordinary publics most pressing problems tend to be simple, these are straightforward 
solutions to meet complex national interest. Often they call for mobilizing answers, such 
as ‘out with the parasites foreigner’ and ‘we have paid enough’. 
Forth, populism is rather moralistic than practical. Populists often have no problem 
with contradictions, for example simultaneously promoting economic liberalism and 
lowering of  taxes while promising increased welfare services and easy implementation 
of  high cost policies. 
Fifth, right wing nationalist populism is usually exclusionary. It divides between ‘us’ 
who belong to society and ‘them’ who should not belong to it. Who ‘they’ are can be 
for example immigrants, asylum-seekers, ethnic or religious minorities, even the political 
elite. The ‘others’ are discursively turned into enemies of  ‘us’, threatening ‘our’ identity 
and culture or exploiting and thus ruining the welfare state ‘we’ have built. ‘Others’ are 
here clearly distinguished from the ethnic natives, ‘us’. This often results in open xeno-
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phobia and racism. In Western Europe this is most often aimed against Muslims, for 
example in Austria, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, while in Eastern Europe the 
targets are often Roma people or even Jews, as was the case in earlier times. 
Sixth, populists are anti-elitist. Even though their leaders themselves often tend to 
come from the same privileged background as the elite they tend to discursively create 
elites out of  their critics. Often they claim to be advocates of  the nation and seek to 
speak in her name. In doing so they differentiate between honest ordinary people and 
corrupt elite. One of  the main successes of  populist parties in Scandinavia is indeed by 
criticizing consensus politics of  the political elite.
Seventh, while often claiming to be economically liberal populists are more usually 
protectionist of  national production from international competition, especially in the 
field of  agriculture. Often they exploit lack of  confidence, for example in wake of  crisis. 
They voice dissatisfaction of  those losing out accompanying increased globalization and 
rapid social change. This brings forward the eighth characteristics, which is rather speak-
ing to emotions than reason and avoiding the more intellectual debate.
Nine, populist parties are usually tough on crime. They emphasize law and order, 
often claiming that the system rather protects criminals than their victims amongst the 
ordinary public. Finally, all of  the contemporary populist parties are Eurosceptic. Some 
only talk about stemming further integration, while others strive to spill back Europe-
anization and even abolish the European Union. When tying these elements together 
a picture emerges: Right wing populists in Europe are anti-immigrant, anti-elitist and 
Eurosceptic moralists who are economically protectionist, promoters of  law and order 
and foes to multicultural development on the continent. They speak rather to emotions 
than reason, distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and rely on strong charismatic leaders 
who advocate simple solutions to complex issues burdening the ordinary public.
Taken collectively they are perhaps most simply ‘Nay-sayers’ who resist change as 
Hans Georg Betz (2001) claims. In effect they strive to stop modernization and social 
change. Most of  the populist parties here discussed and all of  those in the Nordics ac-
cept democracy and parliamentarianism. This sets contemporary right wing nationalist 
populists apart from earlier fascism and Nazism versions who often favored authoritar-
ian leadership. 
Populists can be either right or left wing. Fundamental difference between the two is, 
though, that while the right is preoccupied with interest of  the ordinary public the left is 
particularly concerned with the socially underprivileged. Both however unite in criticism 
of  business and political elite, for example in the EU. Next I turn to identifying three 
waves of  populism since the 1970s.
1.1 First wave
The French Front National founded and led by the colorful Jean Marie Le-Penn was one 
of  the first right wing populist movements in Europe, constructed in the early 1970s, 
directly in opposition to post-war multiculturalism and immigration, mostly from Muslim 
countries. Meanwhile a different sort of  right wing populism was brewing in Denmark 
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and Norway. Protesting against rising tax levels, the Danish and Norwegian Progressive 
Parties (d. Fremskridtspartiet, n. Fremskrittspartiet) (FP) promoted anarcho-liberalism 
and campaigned against increased economic and bureaucratic burden on the ordinary 
man. They argued against wide scope social services, immigration and cozy consensus 
politics in these corporatist social-democratic welfare states. This was not the regular right 
wing neo-liberal rhetoric but rather a new populist version, where charismatic leaders 
positioned themselves alongside the blue color public and against the political elite. The 
Nordic populist parties started out being fiscally libertarian before moving more middle 
ground on economic policy while turning even further hostile against immigration. 
Danish politics were permanently altered in 1973 when previously unknown tax at-
torney, Mogens Glistrup, was able snatch almost sixteen per cent of  the votes in par-
liamentary election for his new anti-tax movement. Positioning himself  against the es-
tablished political elite Glistrup argued that tax evasion should be regarded civil liberty 
(See in Klein 2013, 107). The sudden success of  his party was mostly at the expense of  
the Social Democratic Party, which was loosing grips with the blue color working class. 
The FP held strong position in Danish politics until its leader was in 1983 sentenced 
to prison for tax evasion. Glistrup’s absence gave way to his successor, the likable Pia 
Kærsgaard, who successfully maneuverer to fill the vacuum, adding thick anti-immigrant 
rhetoric to the mix of  tax deduction, which she later started to tone down.
Same year as the Danish FP rushed to the surface, in 1973, the Norwegian version 
also found its first success on a similar platform, securing five per cent in parliamentary 
election. Initially named Anders Lange Party for Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and 
Public Intervention (ALP) the focus was on implementing libertarian policies of  far 
reaching tax reductions. The leader, Anders Lange, was linked to nationalistic move-
ments like The Fatherlands League (Fedrelanslaget), but it was his emphasis on breaking 
up the tax system and claiming to speak for the ordinary man against the elite that ap-
pealed to the public. Lange did not survive long in Norwegian politics. Rather, it was his 
successor, the charismatic Carl I. Hagen, who was able to firmly establish the FP within 
Norway’s political party system, holding to power in the party for almost the next three 
decades (Jupskas 2013).
Skinheads emerged on the streets of  many European capitals in the 1980s. Dis-
gruntled youths were violently marching against immigrants, for example in Britain, 
Germany, Italy and through Scandinavia. Revealing in fascist symbols, such as Nazi tat-
toos, wearing swastikas and playing loud white pride rock music these demagogues were 
positioned on the fringe of  society. Only later were nationalist populists disguising their 
neo-fascist nature, for a more mainstream façade.
1.2 Second wave
Some of  the populist parties finding success in the second and third wave were es-
tablished before, sometimes initially as mainstream parties, only later turning populist. 
These include for example the Freedom Party of  Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Öster-
reichs - FPÖ), rising to power during the second wave in the 1990s. After retuning the 
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party in a populist direction, by tapping into fears and emotions of  the ordinary public, 
while avoiding the more intellectual debate, the charismatic leader Jörg Haider turned 
FPÖ to become perhaps the most influential in the country, entering government in 
2000. With a wink of  approval to Nazi veterans he told the people ‘I say what you think’ 
(Quoted in Grabow & Hartleb 2013, 19). This he was however only able to do with ac-
tive support from the country’s largest tabloid, the Kronenzeitung. The tabloid joined 
in on the defiance against the elite, for example turning against the established serious 
media elite. Such was to become the recipe for populist parties success throughout Eu-
rope: charismatic leaders backed by the tabloid media, relating to ordinary publics fears 
of  the foreign rather than participating in the intellectual political debate. 
On that platform the Flemish block (Vlaams Belang) rose in Belgium as well as the 
Swiss Peoples Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) in Switzerland, coming into govern-
ment in 2004, travelling from once being mainstream agrarian party to become populist. 
Similar trends were occurring in Italy, where the neo-fascist Italian Allenza Nazionale 
had joined Berlusconi’s first government a decade earlier, in 1994, and Umberto Bossi’s 
Northern League (Lega Nord) was rising. The hooligan British National Party (BNP) 
was also building in this period. In the Netherlands Pim Fortuyn’s List (Ljist Pim For-
tuyn) claimed to be protecting Dutch liberalism against authoritarian Islamism. Geert 
Wilders Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid – PVV) established after Fortuyn’s mur-
der in Amsterdam did indeed honor that liberalist heritage while adding to the mix more 
general anti-Muslim rhetoric.
The second wave of  populist nationalist right rose partly in response to anticipated 
integration with the post-communist Eastern Europe – most of  the newly free countries 
were expected to be joining the EU in fullness of  time.  This was also a time of  rising na-
tionalism throughout Eastern Europe in wake of  the collapsed communist model. Most 
notorious was ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Populist nationalists rose in Russia and 
throughout the former eastern block.  The Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná 
Strana – SNS) was established already in 1990, in Poland the Kaczynski brothers rose to 
power with their party Law and Justice (Prawo I Sprawiedliwość) and Lithuania similarly 
saw rise of  their version named Order and Justice (Tvarka ir Teisingumas). In a more 
militant style the Jobbik-movement was gaining strength in Hungary, toying with full-
blown neo-Nazism. 
In Scandinavia nationalist populism was also being remodeled during the second 
wave. Pia Kærsgaard established the Danish Peoples Party (Dansk Folkeparti – DF) in 
1993. By carefully crafting her message to become more socially acceptable the DF was 
fast moving into the mainstream, toning down the anti-tax rhetoric but still maintaining 
hardcore anti-immigrant policies. The DF campaigned against multi-ethnic Denmark 
and what it called foreign infiltration of  Danish society. Its 2002 manifesto for example 
stated that Denmark should belong to the Danes (Danish People’s Party 2002).
Arguing that immigrants were parasites on the Danish welfare system, which as a 
result would be severely weakened, to the detriment of  ethnic Danes when in need of  
services, the party was to become perhaps the most influential in Denmark, rapidly 
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becoming one of  the largest in Parliament and coming into position of  power when 
backing the right of  center governments of  2001 to 2011. Stirring up fear amongst the 
public that influx of  Muslims was threatening national Danish culture and identity the 
party was able to alter the rhetoric on immigration, which in the years to come became 
the center issue in Danish politics. In many steps they moved to strip immigrants and 
asylum seekers of  rights and benefits, which Social Democratic governments had previ-
ously introduces. 
These troubled immigrant relations, which had mostly occurred without much at-
tention abroad, only came to international attention in 2005 when established national 
Danish daily Jyllands-Posten commissioned several cartoonists to mock prophet Mo-
hammed in drawings published in the broad sheet paper, causing rage by many Muslims. 
In 2011 this dramatic change in Danish politics came further to light in Europe when 
Denmark unilaterally decided to reintroduce checks on its borders with Germany, violat-
ing at least the spirit of  EU’s open borders policy.  
In Norway Carl I. Hagen was steering his Progressive Party towards center, to be-
come perhaps the softest version of  populist right wing parties in Europe. However, 
still, similarly to Denmark, the focus of  the party shifted from tax reduction to increas-
ingly voicing concerns that Norway was being turned in a multicultural direction – a 
development the party set to stop. In a dramatic 1994 party congress the liberal wing of  
the party lost influence over to the more nationalist Christian conservative faction. The 
party emphasized importance of  protecting Norwegian culture against foreign influ-
ences and protecting the welfare system from being exploited by immigrants and asylum 
seekers. Furthermore the Norwegian PP turned hostile on the Sami ethnic minority in 
Norway, for example in a resolution of  dissolving the Sami parliament (See further in 
Jupskas, 2013).
When Social Democrats in Europe in the 1990s, after collapse of  the communist 
block, went looking for new voters and seeking more lucrative alliances in center, in 
what was branded the new economy, even in some places toying with neoliberal eco-
nomic policies, the once strong links between Social Democrats and the working class 
was rapidly evaporating. Becoming increasingly occupied with newer and more sophisti-
cated political tasks such as gender equality, democratic reform, professional administra-
tive practices, higher education and environment protection Social Democratic parties 
were by late twentieth century loosing support of  blue color working class throughout 
Europe. Many of  the traditional working class voters on the left felt politically alienated, 
which allowed nationalistic populists to sneak past and fill the vacuum. Like similar par-
ties were able to do elsewhere The Danish Peoples Party was in this climate for instance 
able to mobilize popular support by criticizing established political parties for being elit-
ist and alienated from lives of  the ordinary public. 
The traditional Social Democratic strongholds in Scandinavia for example were hit 
severely. In Denmark the Social Democrats were instantly pushed out of  the top place 
it had occupied for decades and in Norway the Progressive Party was surging, however 
also at the cost of  the conservative party Høyre. In Sweden the Social Democrats were 
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losing their former hegemonic power status. This was also the time of  similar populist 
party-building in Sweden and Finland. The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna – 
SD) and The True Finns (Perussuomalaiset – PS), though rather found success during 
the following third wave, which I turn to next.
1.3 Third wave
Support for populist parties surged again in Europe in wake of  the international fi-
nancial crisis starting in 2008, marking rise of  the third wave of  post-war right wing 
nationalism (See for example Wodak & Khosravi 2013). The crisis shook foundations of  
Western capitalism, bringing economic uncertainty, severe public austerity and increased 
hardship on the ordinary public, which largely felt victimized by both business and po-
litical elites. In this climate of  fear and anger nationalist populists found fertile ground 
for their message criticizing elite and campaigning against immigration and European 
integration as well as perhaps even more generally the entire capitalist order, which they 
claimed was eschewed against the ordinary public. 
Once again after retuning their rhetoric in a more mainstream direction and away 
from open xenophobia populist parties were founding much greater public support. In 
the UK the more modest populist version UK Independence Party (UKIP) was replac-
ing the openly racist BNP. In France, Front National found renewed support under 
leadership of  the more composed looking Marine Le Pen, who had replaced her more 
aggressive father Jean-Marie Le Pen, winning a fifth of  the vote in the 2011 presidential 
elections and 14 per cent in the parliamentary election in the following year, after almost 
two decades absence from the national parliament. 
In Norway Siv Jensen replaced long-standing leader of  the Progressive Pary, Carl I. 
Hagen, eventually landing the party in government as coalition partner with the con-
servatives. In Denmark Pia Kærsgaard had successfully moved the Danish Peoples Party 
from the fringe to be considered almost mainstream. This she had done by changing the 
discourse in the country rather than modifying much her message. 
At the same time more militant and openly racist parties were also gaining support 
in many other European countries. In Hungary the Jobbik movement was still going 
strong, making populist premier Viktor Orbán, leader of  the Fidesz, almost looking 
mainstream. In Bulgaria the Attack Party (AtaKa) was growing and in Greece the Golden 
Dawn was outright neo-Nazi. In Norway notorious terrorist Anders Behring Breivik, 
responsible for the Utøya massacre in 2011, had left the Progressive Party, which he 
believed was too soft on immigration and plugged into loose knit underground network 
of  militants, mostly communicating their racist message below surface online. 
Contrary to Denmark and Norway where populist parties have been part of  the 
political flora since 1970s such parties only saw rising support in Finland and Sweden 
during the third wave. Xenophobic right wing populist movements had though always 
existed in Sweden, many deeply rooted in neo-Nazi rhetoric. These had though previ-
ously always been marginalized on the fringe of  Swedish politics. This changed in 2010 
when the Sweden Democrats won their first seats in parliament, then surging from five 
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to 13 per cent in 2014. Though its young leaders still had ties to Sweden’s neo-Nazi past 
and even while bringing forward a more chauvinistic nationalistic message than popu-
lists in neighboring countries the new version movement was able to transform itself  
enough to emerge as viable option to many disgruntled voters (See Klein 2013). 
Despite this development towards mainstreaming of  nationalistic rhetoric, militant 
far right movements still exist throughout all of  the Nordics, often linking ancient Norse 
mythology with neo-Nazi ideology. Though the Norwegian Progressive Party is perhaps 
the softest version of  European populist parties it was the political breeding ground of  
far right terrorist Anders Bhering Breivik. The Progressive Party only suffered a minor 
crisis after his Oslo and Utøya attacks in 2011. After sinking severely in the municipal 
election later in the year the party had fully recovered already in the 2013 parliamentary 
election when its new leader Siv Jensen found her way into government.  
In 2011, year after Sweden Democrats hit its first electoral breakthrough, the True 
Finns won much larger across the border, landing impressive roughly 19 per cent of  the 
vote in the Finish parliamentary election. The True Finns can be traced to the populist 
Finnish Rural Party (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue) – and even partly all the way through 
to the nationalist Lapua movement in the late 1920s and 1930s. In wake of  the crisis 
True Finns leader, the charismatic Timo Soini, rode a wave of  increased intolerance for 
contributing to EU’s plan of  bailing out troubled states, mostly in southern Europe. 
During the Euro-crisis, when rescue packages for nations in need were being negoti-
ated, The True Finns for example successfully campaigned on the slogan ‘Paid enough’ 
(Quoted in Grabow and  Hartleb 2013, 31). 
Similarly to populists elsewhere, Soini was able to position himself  on the side of  the 
ordinary man and against corrupted elites, both domestic and European. In line with 
counterparts in Denmark and Norway the True Finns can also be positioned central on 
the socio-economic left/right scale, in protection of  the Nordic welfare system. Refer-
ring to ethno nationalism and Christian social values Soini emphasized Finnishness and 
protecting the national culture from being contaminated by immigrants and by other 
foreign influences (Raunio 2013). 
Greatest success of  populist parties in the third wave came in the European Parlia-
ment elections of  2014. Most spectacularly, in three western European countries popu-
list surged to the very front, in Denmark and the UK where they won 27 per cent each 
and in France, winning 25 per cent. This was the first time in Europe when populist par-
ties finished first in national elections. More militant fascist version also saw significant 
gains, including the fascist Golden Dawn and rather leftwing Syriza in Greece, Jobbik 
in Hungary and Attack in Bulgaria. Eurosceptisism was also finding its way to Germany 
and to many of  the more traditionally pro-EU countries. 
In an attempt to stem the electoral tight towards populist parties many mainstream 
parties have reverted to adopting some of  their rhetoric, thus shifting the general politi-
cal discourse in the populist direction and widening what is considered acceptable in 
public debate, as for example has occurred in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands 
(Grabow and Harleb 2013, 25).
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2. Heritage of the independence struggle: Icelandic nationalism
Politics2 in Iceland revolve around a double axis: the traditional left–right axis and an in-
ternationalist–isolationist axis structured by the issue of  Iceland’s sovereignty in relation 
to mostly NATO and European cooperation. This somewhat mirrors the tension in the 
national identity created in the independence struggle of  the 19th and early 20th century 
(1830–1944). Since politics in Iceland have been dominated by the nationalist discourse. 
Postcolonial theories emphasize the importance of  analyzing the impact of  colonial 
contact on contemporary politics and the cultural legacy of  colonialism, and thus criti-
cally explore the link between the past and the present – which I claim is central to an 
understanding of  the development of  Icelandic politics. I maintain that it is through that 
relationship that Iceland’s postcolonial cultural-political national identity was created, 
emphasizing formal sovereignty as well as a desire to be recognized as a partner in the 
Western world (See Bergmann 2014b).
Most students of  Icelandic politics indeed acknowledge the importance of  the in-
dependence struggle in the development of  its contemporary political identity (see 
Grímsson 1978; Hálfdanarson 2001; Hermannsson 2005 and Karlsson 2000). I however 
furthermore claim that this is not a question of  a temporary situation fading out over 
time after the country had gained independence, but rather an established and regu-
larly reconstructed political culture, still ongoing in contemporary politics (for more, see 
Bergmann 2011).
The independence struggle was led by a small group of  Icelandic intellectuals in 
Copenhagen, who, by referring to Iceland’s history of  independent Vikings, developed 
a national myth that served as a justification for their emphasis on sovereignty and inde-
pendence. The term myth is here used in the sense that Iceland’s history was creatively 
interpreted to fit the claim for self-rule. According to the myth, Iceland is a unique 
nation and it is the duty of  all Icelanders to actively guard its sovereignty and independ-
ence. History professor Guðmundur Hálfdanarson (2001, 96) explains how Iceland’s in-
dependence hero Jón Sigurðsson has since become the symbolic father of  all Icelanders.
Iceland’s national myth, which developed in the independence struggle, creates a 
Golden Age starting with the settlement in the year 874, peaking after the state-like 
formulation in 930 and ending when Iceland fell under foreign rule with the Old Treaty 
with Norway in 1262. Further deterioration occurs when falling under Danish rule in 
1380 and with introduction of  Absolutism in 1662. Several texts were later influential 
in reaffirming this myth. Jón Jónsson Aðils (1869–1920), who in 1911 became Iceland’s 
first history professor, described the society of  the Golden Age as superior to all others 
and its unique and pure language as the key to its soul (Jónsson Aðils 1903).
According to the myth, Icelandic society started to deteriorate after the country en-
tered into the Old Treaty. Then only in the early 19th century, courageous and wise men 
finally rose up and reclaimed the nation’s own worth and lifted the national spirit by 
fighting for its independence. As Nielsen Germaud (2010) explains, the myth creates a 
U-shaped curve of  history, whose two peaks – in the distant past and at the end of  the 
story – represent autonomy and the avoidance of  external influence.
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This myth was kept alive throughout the 20th century, for example, in schoolbooks. 
The most influential was written by Jónas Jónsson frá Hriflu, an educator who also was 
the founder and leader of  the Progressive Party and one of  the most influential figures 
in Icelandic politics and culture. According to his textbook (1924), read by all elementary 
students for decades, Iceland’s economic prosperity is directly attributed to its gaining 
independence from Denmark. Icelanders are furthermore pictured as the finest ‘se-
lection’ of  Norwegians, descendants of  the strong and independent-minded farmers 
who fled the oppression of  King Harald to protect their freedom. He then claims that 
this noble breed of  Norway’s finest social class was through the centuries shaped by 
the harshness of  the natural surroundings, creating the unique Icelandic nation, which 
compares to no other. Historian Guðmundur Finnbogason (1925) further claimed that 
the harsh Icelandic environment had through the centuries weeded out the weakest and 
thus even increased the quality of  the population. This same myth was then for example 
reproduced in the boom years in early 21st century by Iceland’s president Ólafur Ragnar 
Grímsson when explaining how Icelanders were all but destined for greatness in the new 
global economy (See in Bergmann 2011, Ch. VI).
2.1 An Everlasting struggle
It should be stressed here that Iceland’s national myth is not unique. Indeed, many na-
tions base their nationhood on similar kinds of  myth creation. This is what Anthony D. 
Smith (1993) calls the ‘Cult of  a Golden Age’: the fact that national leaders often refer to 
a Golden Age in time of  hardship to reinforce a sense of  community. What is, however, 
interesting is that after Iceland had gained full independence the independence strug-
gle did not end. Rather, a new one started: the ever-lasting independence struggle. And 
a new political idea was born: the notion that the fight for independence is a constant 
struggle and that it will never end (Bergmann 2011). Accordingly, it is the collective 
duty of  all Icelanders to guard the country’s independence. In his landmark study on 
Icelandic politics, including the Icelandic political identity, political science professor 
Olafur Ragnar Grímsson (1978), later President of  Iceland, claimed that this common 
understanding of  Icelandic nationalism, created in the independence struggle, had since 
become one of  the most important ideas in Icelandic political discourse.
Historian Guðmundur Hálfdanarson (2001, 36–39) explains how this sense of  na-
tionalism was stronger in Iceland than in most other European states at the time, being 
based on a historical conviction that justified the full formal sovereignty and independ-
ence of  the nation. The nation became almost a concrete natural fact in the Icelandic 
mind. A free and sovereign Icelandic nation became an integral part of  the self-image of  
the nation. Icelandic nationalism was thus created on the basis of  a romantic notion of  
a natural and pure, or at least special, separate nation. This notion became a vital force 
in the independence struggle.
When studying Iceland’s nation-building, it can be seen that the fragility of  the na-
tion is always present. The notion of  constant threat to its very existence can, for ex-
ample, been found in the writings of  parliamentarian Bjarni Jónsson at the beginning 
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of  the 20th century. After claiming that the nation as such is the core of  their spiritual 
life he insists that all ‘good Icelanders’ should do their utmost to ‘protect and promote 
their nationality’ (quoted in Bjarnason 2013, 21). Otherwise, Icelanders ran the risk of  
‘vanishing in the vast ocean of  nations.’ To prevent such devastation, Icelanders had to 
nourish their cultural heritage and indeed ‘prove both to themselves and to others that 
they are a living nation.’ In 1907, the largest newspaper in Reykjavik similarly wrote that 
Icelanders must be proactive in showing others that on the island lives a ‘separated and 
remarkable cultural nation [...] this we must strive to become recognized for throughout 
the educated word’ (quoted in ‘Ísland fyrir Íslendinga,’ 1907).
The dual insistence of  being formally sovereign as well as on being recognised as an 
equal partner in Europe has developed into what can be termed the Icelandic Postcolo-
nial Project (see Bergmann 2014b). It has also developed into a divide in Icelandic poli-
tics between isolationists and internationalists. One side emphasizes independence while 
the other expresses a wish to be a fully functioning modern economy on an equal foot-
ing with other participants in Western culture. While one part of  the national identity 
pulls Iceland away from others, by emphasizing its uniqueness, the other part is pushing 
for participation in the global economy to further Iceland’s prosperity.
3. Populist politics and the Progressive Party
Perhaps similarly to Ireland, where O Malley (2008) argues that existence of  populist Sin 
Fein hindered rise of  radical right, this almost universal acceptance of  nationalism across 
party lines in Iceland can explain lack of  specific prominent right wing nationalist par-
ties emerging until the financial crisis. Still a few such movements have survived on the 
fringe. Out of  a relatively broad movement of  Icelandic nationalists (Þjóðernishreyfing 
Íslendinga) a small Nazi party (Flokkur þjóðernissina) was formed in 1934 – somewhat 
inspired by German interwar Nazi politics – but dying out during WWII when German 
Nazi devastations came to light (for more, see Jökulsson & Jökulsson 1989). 
Nationalist politics however always remained within the Icelandic mainstream par-
ties. In the 1980’s a movement called Nordic Race (Norrænt mannkyn) emerged in 
opposition to Icelanders mixing family ties with people of  other races. Reportedly a 
few Progressive Party representatives and leaders frequented their meetings (Jökulsson 
1995).
Around turn of  the millennium a group of  young males in southern Iceland founded 
the Association of  Icelandic Nationalists (Félag íslenskra þjóðernissinna), these were 
mostly uneducated skinheads types rallying on racist views, such as that black people 
were intellectually inferior to whites. In its wake a more sophisticated association called 
Party for Progress (Flokkur framfarasinna) was established in opposition to multicul-
turalism and protection of  Iceland’s Nordic heritage. More fringe militant factions were 
also found in for example Icelandic versions of  international hate-movements like Com-
bat 18 and Bood&Honor (for more, see Bergmann 2007). I the wake of  the January 
attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris an Icelandic PEDIGA association was founded – the 
German initiated association fighting against Islamization in Europe.
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None of  these movements however enjoyed mainstream support. First party repre-
sented in parliament to toy with populist nationalist tendencies was the so-called Liberal 
Party (Frjálslyndi flokkurinn), which in autumn of  2006 turned against multiculturalism 
and immigration. The party had been founded in 1999 in opposition to Iceland’s fisher-
ies policy. By late 2006 the party was polling far below the threshold of  remaining in 
parliament in the coming spring elections. In a coordinated move its MP’s stormed the 
media in November 2006 armed with anti-immigrant rhetoric. Its Reykjavik leader wrote 
that Iceland should be for Icelanders and that he did not want ‘people from brother-
hood of  Mohammed’ (Magnússon 2006). The chairman said that immigrants should be 
tested for diseases (Kristjánsson 2007) and the vice-chairman said it was a ‘black day in 
the history of  the nation’ when citizens of  the EU eastern enlargement gained rights 
to work in Iceland in 2006 (Hafsteinsson 2006). The leader of  youth movement faired 
that immigration would bring ‘drug pushers’, ‘human trafficking’, ‘tuberculosis’, forced 
labor’, and ‘planned rapes’ (Guðjohnsen 2007). In less than a month the party’s support 
quadrupled in opinion polls, securing its three seats in the spring 2007 elections (for 
more, see Bergmann 2008).
3.1 The new Progressive Party
The Progressive Party, Iceland’s established agrarian party, had for decades seen steadily 
diminished support leading up to the Crash of  2008 and seemed more likely to be leav-
ing Icelandic politics. After the Crash, however, a completely renewed leadership took 
over stewardship and rapidly retuned the party in a more populist direction. As a result 
the PP surged leading up to the 2013 elections, grabbing quarter of  the vote and landing 
at the helm of  subsequent coalition government, together with the old hegemonic IP. 
Though rooted in traditional agricultural society and based on national sentiments 
the PP had in the years leading up to the Crash gradually been modernizing and moving 
to bait urban voters. Traditionally the party had been reluctant regarding EU relations 
but since the 1990s it had become at least EU curious – for the period 2000–2004 even 
leading the pro-EU debate (see Bergmann 2011). The new post-crisis leadership, headed 
by novice Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, however quickly reversed to older era politics, ag-
gressively fighting against the EU application put forward by the left wing government 
in 2009. 
In public debate the EU application was directly linked to the so-called Icesave-
dispute Iceland fought with the British and Dutch governments over responsibility of  
deposits in the fallen Icelandic owned Icesave internet-based bank, a branch of  the 
Icelandic Landsbanki. Gunnlaugsson had emerged as one of  the most defiant voices 
against the foreign pressure Iceland felt in the dispute, rising onto the public stage with 
his group InDefence formed in opposition to British actions against Iceland, for imple-
mentation of  Anti-Terrorist legislation3 (The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008, 2008).
The appearance of  leniency of  the left wing government in the dispute helped spur-
ring a new wave of  protests. At once, the dispute with the British and Dutch govern-
ments fell into familiar trenches of  nationalistic rhetoric. In the long-drawn out dispute, 
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the Icesave agreements appeared to have become the most unpopular since the Old 
Treaty with Norway in 1262, when according to the national myth Iceland’s economy 
started to deteriorate after it had fallen under foreign rule and entered into a period of  
humiliation by losing its independence.
The change in the national rhetoric, from the superiority discourse of  the boom 
years to the idea of  being under siege by ill-willed foreigners after The Crash of  2008, 
was quite rapid (See Bergmann 2011, Ch. VI). On the surface it might even seem that 
those two ideas were in contradiction. However, when analysing the harsh nationalistic 
rhetoric of  the Icesave debate, it can be seen that it had the same origin as the rhetoric 
on the Icelandic economic miracle heard in the first decade of  the new millennium: 
Iceland’s postcolonial national identity. The core of  both ideas is found in the national 
myth created during the independent struggle in the 19th century, written down by Jón 
Jónsson Aðils at the beginning of  the 20th century and kept alive and nourished by 
politicians of  all ranks throughout the decades and then put into new perspectives by 
the likes of  President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. 
Tapping into this rhetoric the new PP leadership claimed that Iceland was a victim 
of  vicious foreigners who had conspired to bring Iceland to its knees. Once again in 
autumn 2010 thousands of  protesters were surrounding the parliament building. Flags 
symbolizing Iceland’s independence could now be seen flying high in front of  the Parlia-
ment building. Amongst them were blue EU flags on which a red no-entry sign had been 
painted right across the yellow stars.
PP leader Gunnlaugsson (2009) went as far as accusing then PM Ms Jóhanna 
Sigurðardóttir of  ‘humiliating the nation’ by ‘forcing her nation to pay the Icesave debt 
burden’. Instead of  protecting the nation, he claimed, the government was working on 
behalf  of  the British and the Dutch to attack Iceland. Similarly, one of  the PP’s most 
prominent MP, Ms Eygló Harðardóttir (2009), accused the government of  high treason. 
The rhetoric was very much emotion driven. PP leaders forcefully and systematically 
accused those they claimed belonging to the left wing Reykjavik elite of  betraying their 
nation at time of  need. 
Being the only of  the four mainstream parties to consistently fight against any agree-
ment on Icesave the PP was gaining new ground in wake of  two extraordinary refer-
endums on the issue in 2010 and 2011, spurred by a presidential veto. After the EFTA 
Court ruling in favor of  Iceland on 28 January 2013 (EFTA Court ruling, 2013) the PP 
surged. 
The party gained further popularity by promising to force foreign creditors, which 
they systematically referred to as ‘vulture funds’ (hrægammasjóðir), to pay for debt relief  
of  household loans, which Gunnlaugsson indicated would be 20 per cent, amounting to 
estimated 300 billion krona (reported in Vilhjálmsson 2013). Aligning themselves along-
side the ordinary household’s and against the international financial elite this is perhaps 
an example of  providing simple solution to complex problem. In a radio interview on 
his policy of  forcing foreign creditors to pay for household debt relief  he linked the 
issue to the Icesave dispute, describing Icelanders as David knocking down Goliath 
47Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive 
Party turned populist?
Eiríkur Bergmann
STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
(Gunnlaugsson 2014). When opposition grew Gunnlaugsson said it was time for Ice-
landers to legislate against lobbyism of  foreign stakeholders (see in Karlsson 2014). 
In the end the party claimed to have made good on their promise by implementing 
state funded debt relief  of  80 billion kronas to households with inflation indexed loans. 
Gunnlaugsson used his first ceremonial PM address on Iceland’s National Day, on 
17 June 2013, to place himself  even more firmly than most of  his predecessors within 
the established postcolonial discourse, mainly emphasizing Iceland’s heritage and cel-
ebrating the nation’s defiance against foreign oppression in the Icesave dispute. While 
dismissing IMF’s concerns he added that international institutions – which he mockingly 
referred to as ‘international abbreviations’ – would no longer dictate Iceland’s economic 
policies. Referring to the Viking heritage, he explained that precisely because they were 
descended from Vikings, Icelanders were independently minded and would thus not 
surrender to foreign authority (Gunnlaugsson 2013). This is an example of  how the 
discursive representation of  the past is indeed continually present in Icelandic politics. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that the contemporary political condition in Iceland is 
very much a result of  its historical relationship with neighboring countries. At his party 
congress after the 2013 election the new leader referred in a romantic fairytale style to 
Iceland as the model country of  the world (Gunnlaugsson 2013).
Skipping over the more liberal and pro-EU times in the PP’s recent history the post-
crisis leadership aligned itself  closer to the further back and more nationalistic in the 
party’s history, most commonly to its founder Jónas Jónson frá Hrifu, but also referring 
to his inspiration, the nationalistic writings of  historian Jón Jónsson Aðils, both dis-
cussed earlier in this paper. The party’s use of  imagery and symbols mirrored this turn 
to nationalism. New version of  its logo used at the 2011 party congress for example 
underlined the change. Showing the Icelandic flag being born as a rising sun out of  the 
party’s agrarian flag under slogan reading: Iceland in bright hope (Ísland í vonana birtu). 
Symbols expert, Guðmundur Oddur Magnússon, Professor at Iceland’s University of  
the Arts, maintains that the party’s new imagery refers to nationalistic – bordering on 
fascist – ideology of  the 1930s, as for example was found in the collection of  its founder 
Jónas Jónsson frá Hriflu (Magnússon 2011).
More benign display of  nationalism was for example when PP leader Gunnlaugsson, 
remaining true to his party long standing heavy protectionism of  Icelandic agriculture, 
announced his new diet of  only eating Icelandic food (Gunnlaugsson 2011b).
These changes are all in line with development of  populist politics in Europe de-
scribed earlier in the paper – that is; being nationalist, anti-elite, anti-EU, emotionalist 
and protectionist and providing simple solutions to complex issues. As a result, many 
members holding more liberal views were leaving the party in opposition to the change. 
Amongst the more prominent was MP Guðmundur Steingrímsson, son and grandson 
of  two of  the party´s former leaders, who left with the more liberal faction of  the PP 
and established a new centrist liberal party called Bright Future, together with splinters 
from the SDA and people of  the so-called Best Party – a humoristic protest party in 
Reykajvik. Bright future won four seats in the 2013 parliamentary election. 
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The last of  the liberal faction left when the PP delved further into populist com-
munication by increasingly raising concerns of  immigrants in Iceland. In Parliament’s 
question time Gunnlaugsson for example implied that the state should specifically map 
organized crime of  asylum seekers (Gunnlaugsson 2011a). This led the PPs own as-
sociation in Kópavogur, neighboring town to Reykjavik, to publicly object to the anti 
immigrant rhetoric of  the new leadership – most of  the critical members subsequently 
left the party. With critical voices gone from the party, Gunnlaugsson became its uncon-
tested and indeed celebrated leader, holding its MPs firmly on the new party line, which 
also is common feature in populist politics. The party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric was only 
to heighten, for example when one of  its leading MP’s, Vigdís Hauksdóttir, suggested 
that asylum seekers should wear GPS tracking device around their ankle (Hauksdóttir 
2013b).
This change in the party’s rhetoric was causing even some of  its traditional national-
ists to object, for example its former leader, Jón Sigurðsson, who described himself  as 
what he called being a ‘nationist’ (see his book (2013) celebrating Icelandic ‘Nationism’ 
(þjóðhyggja).
This transformation of  the established Progressive Party in a populist direction 
caused widespread criticism in society, which Gunnlaugsson and his new team however 
easily dismissed as undermining tactics of  urban elitist left leaning liberals. Many in the 
leadership widely complained of  being victim of  bullying by the left wing intelligencia 
in politics, academia and media, which collectively was without merit branding the PP as 
populist. It was though not only the critics who were linking the PP with populist parties 
in Europe. For example, when on Facebook linking to a documentary on Nigel Farrage 
one of  the PP’s more prominent members, former chairman of  the party in Reykjavik, 
Jón Ingi Gíslason, wrote that UKIP was the British version of  the PP (Gíslason 2014).
However, with anti-Muslim rhetoric mostly lacking, critics of  the PP were still 
not able to firmly ranking it with contemporary right wing populists in Europe. This 
changed leading up to the 2014 municipal election when PP candidates objected to a 
Muslim mosque being built on a lawn in Reykjavik, which City Council had already as-
signed for that use to the Association of  Icelandic Muslims. Its top candidate Sveinbjörg 
Sveinbjörnsdóttir (2014) wrote: ‘while we operate a [Christian] National Church, we 
should not provide building lawns for houses like mosques or Greek Orthodox Church.’
When explaining her statement in a following TV debate she added: ‘Would you like 
to live in society, which, like the Swedes had to implement last week, that it is punishable 
– who could have imagined, that Swedes had to implement laws making it punishable to 
force people into marriage?’ (Sveinbjörnsdóttir 2014b).
There are less than thousand registered Muslims in Iceland and no serious incidents 
of  clashes between Muslim community and Icelanders had been reported. Sveinbjörns-
dóttir’s comments thus spurred aggressive opposition in public debate – but also wide-
spread support, for example in social media and on talk radios in-calling segments. Many 
ordinary PP members went much further than their representatives. One described 
Muslims generally as vicious rapists and murderers while stating: ‘We Progressive Party 
members do not want any Mosque’ (Einarsson 2014). 
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Suddenly, a debate on Muslims in Iceland became perhaps the hottest topic in the 
campaign. Many called on the PP leadership to condemn the move of  its Reykjavik 
candidates but Gunnlaugsson kept silent. When opinion polls showed subsequent mas-
sive increase in support of  the party he criticized those who objected to the anti-Muslim 
rhetoric of  political correctness and forcefully suppressing an issue, which indeed, he 
claimed, was important to discuss. Some PP candidates in other municipalities followed 
suit. In Kópavogur one candidate said it was time to protect Christian values, which were 
under attack, and linked Muslims with notorieties such as honor killings, acid attacks, 
rapes and stoning’s (reported in Jóhannsson 2014).
Not all PP candidates however agreed to the anti-Muslim rhetoric. The candidate 
occupying second place of  the party’s Reykjavik list resigned, describing an atmosphere 
of  bigotry in the party, where Muslims were widely mocked while members emphasized 
promotion of  Christian values (reported in Guðjónsson 2014).
The PP was not represented in Reykjavik City Council in the term before the 2014 
election, had fallen below the 5 per cent threshold in the previous election – the capi-
tal being the party’s weakest spot. Before the anti-mosque move the PP was polling at 
around 2 per cent. However, after applying anti-Muslim rhetoric the party went on to 
increase its vote six fold, securing 12.8 percent and winning two representatives. This 
bears clear resemblance to what the Liberal Party was able to do leading up to the 2007 
parliamentary election discussed earlier. 
Instead of  backpedaling away from anti-immigrant rhetoric after the election, they 
kept going. In January 2015 the PP announced appointment of  one of  Iceland’s most 
vocal campaigner for Christian values and harsh critic of  Muslims and gay rights – for-
mer talk radio host Gústaf  Níelsson, who incidentally was registered member of  the 
IP – to Reykjavik City committee on human rights. This caused such outrage both in 
society and also within the PP that the appointment withdrawn (Hilmarsdóttir 2015). 
Often, party members referred to Iceland as somehow pure and benign while de-
scribing other countries as not so pure and not so benign. MP Vigdís Hauksdóttir made 
one of  the more peculiar comments, in a debate over laying a landline for exporting elec-
tricity from Iceland through the seabed to the European continent. Claiming that the 
Icelandic energy was the purest in the world she asked: ‘… are we then ready to mix our 
pure energy with energy of  the European Union countries, and in doing so degrading 
our own and pollute it with the dirty energy which there is found?’ (Hauksdóttir 2013a).
3.2 Change in IP rhetoric and other movements
Nationalist sentiments have always been strong in the Independence Party, as I have es-
tablished in my previous research studying discourse on European relations (Bergmann 
2011). However, anti-immigrant rhetoric had until recently mostly been absent. In wake 
of  the PP’s increased populist rhetoric a few IP representatives did however follow 
suit. Former IP leader and long standing PM Davíð Oddson, turned editor of  the daily 
Morgunbladið, wrote that concerns over immigration, like those voiced by some PP rep-
resentatives and also so-called populist parties in Europe, should be openly discussed. 
While defending both he linked the PP to such populist parties in Europe and accused 
50 STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
Fræðigreinar
those who objected to their rhetoric on Muslims of  political correctness and violent 
silencing of  widespread concerns (reported in Eyjan 2014).  
This was for example echoed by one of  the IP’s most influential neo-liberal scholar, 
Hannes Gissurarson, who wrote that the populist surge seen in European countries 
like the UK and Sweden was a result of  mainstream right wing parties not listening to 
widespread and natural concerns which many people had over immigration (Gissurar-
son 2014).
Much more blatant anti-immigrant rhetoric was found on Facebook, for example 
in a post by IP’s MP Ásmundur Friðriksson, who, when responding to the attack on 
Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015, asked whether Icelanders were safe from similar 
Muslim terrorists and arguing that Iceland’s security was at stake. He asked: ‘Has the in-
terior ministry or the police taken measures to protect Icelanders from such attacks? Has 
the background of  the 1500 Muslims living in Iceland been checked and investigated 
whether some of  the ‘Icelandic Muslims’ have gone for training or fought in Afghani-
stan, Syria or other countries of  unrest amongst Muslims’ (Friðriksson 2015).
Many were to criticize Friðriksson but quite a few also came out in support. For 
example former PP deputy MP turned talk radio host, Arnþrúður Karlsdóttir, who said 
Friðriksson was only saying out loud what people were thinking (see in Hrafnsson 2015). 
Importantly, though, contrary to when PP party members voiced similar views on 
the Muslim mosque, many prominent IP leaders immediately dismissed Friðriksson’s 
concerns as unfounded, bordering on being racist, and pointing out that the MP was in 
fact asking for serious human right violations, which the IP would never stand for, which 
also was directly in violation of  the Icelandic constitution.
4. Conclusion
Nationalism has always been integral part of  contemporary Icelandic politics, as was 
established in part two, based on identity simultaneously emphasizing independence 
and external recognition as a fully functioning modern state deeply rooted in Western 
culture. Though populism is a close relative of  nationalism such movements had until 
the 2008 financial crisis mostly been absent, save for few fringe groups and a period of  
the short lived Liberal Party. 
Integral tension in the two-sided national identity still characterizes Icelandic politics. 
Sometimes the success of  this struggle for independence and external recognition is 
threatened. The most recent threat was felt in the financial crisis of  2008. Iceland’s eco-
nomic relationship with others is interpreted through a romantic nationalistic discourse; 
thus, the meaning of  the crisis cannot be reduced to a purely economic level. Anxiety 
over misreporting in the international media after The Crash spoke for example directly 
to the longstanding fear of  misrecognition by foreigners. 
The crisis opened up a space for a new leadership in the established agrarian Pro-
gressive Party to subsequently tap into this fear. Rapidly the party was transformed in 
a populist direction, as was established in the preceding part. This development was in 
line with third generation surge of  populist parties in Europe, discussed in the first part, 
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many of  which moved away from the more openly racist and fascist factions of  earlier 
times.  
In academic debate there is no single accepted definition of  populism. Here, how-
ever, I have identified ten features, which often characterize contemporary populist 
political parties in Europe: anti-immigrant, anti-elitist and Eurosceptic moralists who 
are economically protectionist, promoters of  law and order and foes to multicultural 
development on the continent. They speak rather to emotions than reason, distinguish 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and rely on strong charismatic leaders who advocate simple 
solutions to complex issues burdening the ordinary public. 
As was documented in the papers third section, examples of  all these elements can 
be found in communications of  the post-crisis PP. It is firmly nationalistic and skep-
tical of  multiculturalism, aggressively anti-EU and heavily protectionists of  domestic 
agricultural production. Its leaders are prone to discursively creating an elite out of  
their advocacies and claiming to speak for the common man, most often the rhetoric 
revolves around protecting ordinary households against both domestic left leaning elite 
and immense foreign forces. In doing so they firmly separate between ‘us’ who belong 
to the inner society and ‘others’ who they see fall outside of  the fence. Its members are 
furthermore, to a higher degree than what is common in other parties, accustomed to 
praising their young leader and often provide what can easily be described as simple 
solutions to complex problems. Moralistic communications are perhaps less evident but 
anti-immigrant rhetoric has heightened, often pointed against asylum seekers but more 
recently being anti-Muslim. 
Being rooted in agrarian society and ranking as Iceland’s oldest mainstream political 
party the PP is of  course not entirely populist. It is still perhaps more firmly nationalist 
than populist. However, when analyzing communicational changes of  the new post-
crisis leadership it is unavoidable to categorize the party amongst at least the softer 
version of  European populist parties, perhaps closest to the Norwegian Progress Party 
(with whom it even shares the name). Elsewhere populist parties have most often been 
founded in opposition to mainstream political parties. Retuning of  established main-
stream party to rank amongst populist movements is comparable to the Swiss Peoples 
Party but in doing so and arriving at helm of  government is only comparable to Austria’s 
Freedom Party in European politics.
Notes
1 Qoutes have been translated by author from Icelandic.
2 Since early 20th century Iceland’s political party system has consisted of  four main but shifting 
parties. The right-of-centre Independence Party (IP) (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) emerged as the largest 
political party and indeed the country’s hegemonic power, simultaneously taping into the heritage 
of  the independence struggle and promote liberal economic policies. The agricultural Progressive 
Party (PP) (Framsóknarflokkurinn) occupied the centre, before turing right. The left wing in Icelandic 
politics was weakened by frequent fragmentation in 20th century, now represented by The Social 
Democratic Alliance (SDA) (Samfylkingin) and the further leftist Left Green Movement (LGM) (Vin-
stri Hreyfingin – grænt framboð). Kristjánsdóttir (2008) explains that it was a peculiarity of  Icelandic 
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socialists in the early 20th century that they were far more nationalistic than similar parties in other 
European countries. In addition to these four main parties, a fifth and sometimes also sixth parties 
have temporarily occupied up to 15 per cent of  the seats in Parliament.
3 Anti Terror, Security and Crime Act, 2001
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